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Abstract
We use a two-sided matching framework to analyze collaboration between heterogeneous
academics and rms. We consider both horizontal and vertical characteristics, i.e., those
related to a¢ nity (e.g., preferences for a type of scientic research) and those related to
ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality scientic output). We build a unique dataset
based on the teams of academics and rms that proposed research projects to the UKs
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Our results are suggestive of positive
assortative matching in terms of ability and type while the matching is negative assortative
in terms of their interactions. The most able and the most applied academics are the ones
that are more likely to propose collaborative as opposed to non-collaborative projects.
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1 Introduction
Science and innovation in modern economies often involves collaboration across institutional
boundaries. Academic research groups sometimes work independently, but inter-institutional
and international collaborations and coauthorships are very common (Wagner and Leydesdor¤,
2005). Similarly, while some technologies are developed by one single rm, many others are
developed by research joint ventures (Kamien et al., 1992). Fortunately, a substantial body
of research in the economics and management literatures has identied the causes and the
consequences of inter-institutional collaboration within institutional markets, i.e., one-sided
marketpartnerships (see Katz and Martin, 1997, and Caloghirou et al., 2003, for reviews).
However, the full transformation of modern societies into knowledge- and science-based
economies also requires collaboration across institutional markets, i.e., two-sided marketpart-
nerships. Business-science links through joint research, consulting or training arrangements, for
example, are key channels of knowledge transfer between academia and industry according to
both academics (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) and rms (Cohen et al., 2002). As a result,
university-industry collaborations are nowadays stronger and more widespread than ever before
(Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Perkmann et al., 2013). Unfortunately, in spite of their tremendous
importance, we know very little about which groups of which institutions engage in collaboration
and which two-sided market partnerships are actually formed.
Take for example the partnership formed in 2007 by Professor Sir Colin John Humphreys of
Cambridge University, who specializes in electron microscopy and analysis, and FEI, a world-
leading company in the production and distribution of electron microscopes. In this case, a
prolic researcher of a top university, whose research is considered basic, collaborated with a
research-intensive rm, heavily oriented toward basic research. We ask whether this pattern
is the most common: Do top academics collaborate with top rms, whereas less productive
researchers collaborate with less productive rms? Do they collaborate because they have similar
preferences? Do they choose each other because of individual or institutional characteristics?
Are other, less productive and more applied academics and rms more likely to stay independent?
This paper investigates the two-sided market collaboration formation process and, in par-
ticular, the characteristics of the resulting partnerships. We study what type of partners on
each side of the market are more likely to collaborate with each other, and which characteristics
a¤ect the likelihood of collaborating, as opposed to working independently. We consider both
horizontaland verticalcharacteristics, i.e., those related to a¢ nity (e.g., preferences for a
type of scientic research) and those related to ability (e.g., capacity to produce high-quality
scientic output). We show that collaboration decisions are a¤ected both by a¢ nity-based and
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ability-based characteristics, as well as by their interactions.
Collaboration has benets and costs for participants on both sides of the market. Academics
claim that industry collaboration provides them with additional funds and insights (Manseld,
1995; Lee, 2000), but it might bias their selection of research topics and methodology (Florida
and Cohen, 1999). Firms report collaborating with academics to get access to new university
research and discoveries (Lee, 2000), although some of these outcomes have little or no com-
mercial value (Jensen et al., 2003). Firms are also concerned with the di¤erences in terms of
organizational and institutional structure, and with the existence of the open science culture in
academia (Dasgupta and David, 1994).1
Overall, previous empirical studies have shown that thanks to collaboration rms obtain
better patents, more products, and increased sales (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Zucker et
al., 2002; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). On the academic side, collaboration has recently
been linked to a higher number of academic publications (Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008; Azoulay
et al., 2009). But Agrawal and Henderson (2002) do not nd signicant e¤ects. Goldfarb
(2008) even reports a negative e¤ect for researchers who maintain funding relationships with
an applied sponsor. Banal-Estañol et al. (2015) suggest that the relationship between industry
collaboration and academic output may resemble an inverted U-shaped curve.
Unfortunately, most of the existing empirical evidence on performance provides average
e¤ects, across all partnerships. Recent evidence, however, stresses the importance of the char-
acteristics of the matched partners in assessing collaboration outcomes. Banal-Estañol et al.
(2013), for example, show that the research projects in collaboration with rms produce more
scientic output than those without them if and only if the rms in the project are research-
intensive. The rewards from collaboration might thus be highly heterogeneous and depend on
own, as well as on potential partnerscharacteristics. For instance, all academics, but especially
those that are more oriented toward basic research, might prefer rms that encourage their em-
ployees to publish scientic articles (Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). Similarly, all rms might
prefer to collaborate with staracademics, as their input increases rm performance (Zucker
et al., 2002). Research-oriented rms and star academics, however, might not be willing or able
to collaborate with all participants on the other side of the market. Given the costs and benets
1Academic researchersindividual characteristics and attitudes, as well as local group norms, have also been
shown to play a role in the collaboration decision (Louis et al., 1989). Firmssize, absorptive capacity and the
adoption of open search strategies are also important factors in the rmswillingness to collaborate (Mohnen and
Hoareau, 2003; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2007). Geographical proximity between
the researchers university and the rms has also been shown to be important, particularly for researchers in
universities with modestly rated faculties (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996).
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of collaborating with each potential partner, how do academics and rms mutually choose each
other, and which of them decide to work independently?
To understand the mechanisms at work, we use a one-to-one two-sided matching framework
of academic researchers and rms developing research projects.2 Participants on each side of
the market are heterogeneous in terms of their scientic ability and the type of research they
undertake (i.e., its degree of appliedness). Each participant can develop a project on her
(its) own, or search for an appropriate partner on the other side of the market to develop
a collaborative project. Our specication of value for collaborative projects can accommodate
complementarities and substitutabilities in terms of partnersabilities as well as the positive and
the negative e¤ects of heterogeneity in terms of knowledge or expertise (Dahlin et al., 2005).
Our theoretical framework underscores the di¤erences of analyzing equilibrium matching in
terms of vertical and horizontal characteristics. Indeed, the two main partner attributes, ability
and type, have di¤erent e¤ects on the value of a partnership. Di¤erences in ability represent
vertical di¤erentiation: an academic (or a rm) with higher ability is a better academic (rm)
than an academic (rm) with lower ability, independent of the characteristics of her (its) partner.
Di¤erences in types of research instead represent horizontal di¤erentiation: an academic (or a
rm) with high type, i.e., undertaking more applied research, is neither better nor worse than
an academic (rm) with low type, i.e., undertaking more basic research. Joint prots increase
when the types of the academic and the rm are, depending on the value of the parameters,
more similar or more distant, not when one of them is high or low.
We use a linear functional form of project value that captures the direct e¤ects of, as well as
interactions between, vertical and horizontal characteristics. Our specication includes a term
based on the cross-product of the abilities, which makes the prot function twice-continuously
di¤erentiable with respect to this attribute. A su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium matching
to be positive (resp. negative) assortative in terms of ability is then that the cross-partial
derivative with respect to the abilities of both partners is positive (negative). In our framework,
as the cross-partial derivative is constant, this condition is both necessary and su¢ cient and
the equilibrium matching is unique. We also include a linear term based on the absolute value
of the di¤erence between types of research, which means that the prot function is not twice-
continuously di¤erentiable everywhere. Still, we identify su¢ cient conditions for the positive or
negative assortative matching to be one of the equilibrium matchings in terms of type. Finally,
we allow for interactions between the main attributes. For instance, distance in types of research
2Our framework follows the approach of Shapley and Shubik (1972), Becker (1973), and Legros and Newman
(2002).
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may reduce the positive impact of ability in the value of the partnership. Distance of types can
be considered a vertical characteristic, even if the types themselves are not. In terms of ability-
a¢ nity pairs, we also provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the negative (positive)
assortative matching to be the unique equilibrium matching.
We build a unique dataset based on the teams of academic researchers and rms that have
proposed research projects to the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC),
the main government agency for research funding for the engineering departments of the UK
universities. The EPSRC grants are allocated to teams of academic researchers alone and also
to teams that include one or more rms as industry partners. For each of our 5; 855 projects, we
identify project participantspast publications, which allow us to construct various measures of
ability and a¢ nity. We use, in particular, the normal count, the impact-factor-weighted sum and
the (average) impact-factor of the publications as proxies for scientic ability and the proportion
of publications in basic or applied journals as a proxy for type of research (Narin et al., 1976;
Godin, 1996; van Looy et al., 2006).
As an empirical strategy, we use both Foxs (2008) maximum score estimationmethod and
Gompers et al.s (forthcoming) probit-counterfactualapproach. The maximum score method
structurally estimates the parameters of a production function whereas the probit-counterfactual
approach estimates the probabilities of matching. Foxs (2008) estimates are consistent but, as
argued by Akkus et al. (2014), estimation methods based on random utility models, such as the
probit-counterfactual approach, are widely understood and applied in other contexts, and thus,
they serve as alternative methods. In addition, the probit-counterfactual approach allows us to
quantify the impact of several pair-wise characteristics on the probability of being matched.
Our structural estimates suggest that partner abilities are complementary, the e¤ect of the
distance between types is negative, and (academic/rm) ability and type distance are substitutes.
According to our theoretical framework, this implies that there is positive assortative matching
in terms of ability: top academics collaborate with top rms whereas academics of lower ability
collaborate with rms of lower ability. Second, there can be positive assortative matching in
terms of type: academics with more applied interests collaborate with rms with more applied
bias. Finally, the matching is negative assortative in terms of ability-a¢ nity pairs, i.e., the
higher the ability of the academics, the closer they are to their partners in terms of type.
Our second empirical strategy, the probit-counterfactual approach, allows us to quantify the
impact of the ranking of the academics and the rms on the probability of being matched. We
show, for instance, that pairs of academics and rms that are in the same quartile of their
respective distribution of abilities are between 13:5% and 28:5% more likely to be matched,
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compared to those pairs that are in di¤erent quartiles. Similarly, academics and rms are 33%
(39:5%) more likely to be matched if they are both above (below) the median in terms of type.
Although positive, the e¤ects of being both above (below) the median in terms of ability are
less strong. Overall, our results suggest that matching occurs at the top of the distribution in
terms of ability but over the whole distribution in terms of a¢ nity.
We also assess the relative importance of the horizontal versus the vertical characteristics, as
well as of the individual versus the institutional characteristics. The horizontal characteristics are
relatively more important than the vertical ones, both in terms of magnitude and the signicance
of e¤ects. Importantly, the characteristics at the individual level are more relevant than those at
the institutional level. Top rms form links with top academic institutions only insofar as they
include top researchers. This reinforces the view that the fundamental unit of collaboration is
composed of individuals, not institutions (Katz and Martin, 1997).
Finally, we investigate the characteristics of the academics that submitted collaborative
instead of non-collaborative projects. As in the case of matched pairs, we use both maximum
score estimation and a probit analysis. Our maximum score estimation results suggest that the
most able academics are those more likely to collaborate but they do not allow us to make a
general statement on whether the most applied or the most basic academics are more likely to
collaborate. Our probit analysis suggests that academics that are above the median in terms
of ability and those who are more applied than the median are 9:1% and 39:5% more likely to
propose collaborative projects, respectively. The characteristics at the individual level seem to
be again more important than those at the institutional level. Indeed, academics in larger and
better-performing universities are neither more nor less likely to submit collaborative projects.
Our leading example ts most of the general properties of the university-industry partner-
ships. Professor Humphreys, a leading academic, collaborates with FEI, a leading rm. Both of
them share the same preferences for the type of research and, as leaders in their markets, they
are matched with a partner with similar preferences. As a top academic and a top and basic rm,
they end up forming a partnership instead of remaining independent. But, in contrast to one of
our results, a basic academic does not stay independent. Finally, our comparison between indi-
vidual and institutional characteristics suggests that FEI collaborates with professor Humphreys
not because he is a professor at Cambridge, but because of his individual characteristics.
This paper provides, to our knowledge, the rst framework to analyze the nature of the
equilibrium matching in terms of a horizontal as well as in terms of a vertical characteristics.
Our framework also enables us to investigate the interaction between a horizontal characteristic
in one side of the market and a vertical one in the other. Our paper also includes an analysis of
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the characteristics of, not only the matched, but also the non-matched agents.
The closest paper to ours is Mindruta (2013), who uses maximum score estimation to iden-
tify ability-based characteristics, constructed from publication and patent data, as a source of
complementarity in university-industry collaboration.3 Instead, we consider both ability- and
a¢ nity-based characteristics (and their interactions) and show that the latter may be even more
important than the former ones. She uses collaboration data between professors at a top U.S.
medical school and their industry partners. Using homogeneous data from 40 universities, we
are also able to compare individual versus institutional characteristics.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Section
3 describes our dataset. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy, and section 5 the results
on matching between matched partners. In section 6, we investigate the characteristics of the
academics who collaborate rather than remain independent. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
We consider a market with m academic researchers A = fA1; A2; :::; Amg; and n rms F =
fF1; F2; :::; Fng. Academics and rms can develop research projects on their own, labeled as
non-collaborative, or form academic-rm partnerships and develop collaborativeprojects.
Due to time and other constraints, agents have the capacity to develop only one project. That
is, the matching is endogenous and we model it as a one-to-one two-sided matching market.4
2.1 Prots for collaborative and non-collaborative projects
Both collaborative and non-collaborative projects are valuable because they may generate new
knowledge, academic papers, and/or patents. In this subsection, we describe rst the value of a
collaborative project between a generic academic A and rm F , and then that of their respective
stand-alone, non-collaborative projects. We assume that collaborative projects can include a
transfer, or compensation, from one side to the other. Indeed, rms can provide additional
3Based on 46 case-study interviews, Carayol (2003) proposes a typology of business-science collaborations and
argues that rms involved in (low) high-risk projects are matched with academic teams of a (low) high excellence.
Agarwal and Ohyama (2013) study, both theoretically and empirically, the labor market for scientists. The
academic and private sectors choose among scientists who di¤er in their ability and preferences, and scientists
choose between academia and industry. Our setup, of course, di¤ers from theirs and includes more than two
classes of participants on each side of the market.
4A two-sided matching market is one in which there are two distinct sets of agents. It is one-to-one if an agent
from one side of the market can be matched only with an agent from the other side or remains unmatched. For
an introduction to matching markets, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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funding to the academics. Similarly, academics can provide consulting services and/or facilitate
access to their laboratories to the rms. The existence of transfers allows us to focus on the total
value of the partnership, i.e., for both partners. We refer to it as simply valuefrom now on.
In our framework, the key determinants of value are the abilitiesof the academic and the
rm as well as their typesof research. The ability parameter A  0 measures the technical
and scientic level of academic A. The parameter F  0 measures the scientic level of rm F ,
i.e., its absorptive capacity or the level of its human capital. We denote by xA; xF 2 [0; 1] the
type of research that researcher A and rm F , respectively, undertake. The types of research
are indexed in the unit interval by their degree of appliedness,with 0 representing the least
applied type possible (i.e., the most basic one) and 1 representing the most applied type possible.
The distance between types, jxF   xAj, measures the degree of heterogeneity between them.
Our framework posits that the value of a collaborative project may depend on both partners
ability, and that the e¤ects of these relationships can be enhanced or curtailed by the partners
heterogeneity in terms of types of research. Specically, the expected prots, or value, of a
project of a pair (A;F ), with characteristics (A; xA) and (F ; xF ), is given by
c(A;F ) = caA + 
c
fF + 1AF + 2 jxA   xF j+ 3A jxA   xF j+ 4F jxA   xF j  C; (1)
where ca and 
c
f measure the individual e¤ect of the academics and rms ability in a collabo-
rative project and C > 0 represents the xed costs of running a collaborative project.5
The other parameters in (1) are interaction terms. The parameter 1 measures whether
partnersabilities are substitute (1 < 0), independent (1 = 0), or complementary (1 > 0).
In the former, a better rm is more valuable for a less-able academic than for a more able one,
whereas in the latter better rms are more valuable for better academics. Depending on the
value of 2, heterogeneity in type can be negative (2 < 0), neutral (2 = 0) or positive (2 > 0)
for prots. Indeed, di¤erences in the type of research each partner usually works on can create
di¢ culties for the collaboration, and therefore 2 < 0. Instead, there can be complementarities
in terms of knowledge or expertise, as is sometimes claimed in the case of interdisciplinarity,
and therefore 2 > 0. Heterogeneity may also be irrelevant, and therefore 2 = 0. In our setup,
di¤erences in types of research represent horizontal di¤erentiation whereas di¤erences in ability
represent vertical di¤erentiation. Indeed, prots increase when the types of academic and rm
are similar, if 2 < 0, or distant, if 2 > 0, not when one of them is high or low.
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5For simplicity, and to concentrate on the e¤ects of heterogeneity in terms of ability and type, our model
assumes that xed costs, those that do not depend on partnersabilities or type di¤erences, are common to all
collaborative projects. Similarly, the xed costs of running the project will be assumed to be the same for all
non-collaborative projects of the academics (rms).
6The resulting prot function in a model in which the type of the project is endogenous would be similar to
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Finally, parameter 3 (resp. 4) measures possible interaction e¤ects between the ability of
the academic (rm) and the distance in type. If 3 > 0, the academics ability and distance
are complementary. In this case, the marginal productivity of the distance (which is positive or
negative depending on the sign of 2) increases with the academics ability, and the marginal
productivity of the academics ability increases with the distance in types. Instead, if 3 < 0
ability and distance are substitutes.
Academics and rms can also run projects on their own. The value of a non-collaborative
project depends on the ability but not on the type. Specically, the expected prots of a non-
collaborative project run by an academic A with characteristics (A; xA) is given by
nA(A) = 
n
aA   ca; (2)
where ca  0 is the xed cost of running a non-collaborative project. We allow the individual
e¤ect of the ability in a non-collaborative project to be di¤erent from that in a collaborative
project, that is, na may be di¤erent from 
c
a. This may be because of moral hazard problems
that may arise when academics work with rms, in which case ca < 
n
a , or because of increased
levels of motivation when they work in collaborative projects, in which case ca > 
n
a .
Similarly, the prots of a non-collaborative project run by a rm F with characteristics
(F ; xF ) is given by
nF (F ) = 
n
f F   cf ;
where cf  0. We assume ca + cf  C because of, for example, the coordination costs of
di¤erent institutional cultures (Dasgupta and David, 1994).
2.2 The market equilibrium matching
We now consider the whole market of academic researchers and rms, in which each academic Ai
is characterized by a pair (xAi ; Ai) and each rm Fj by a pair (xFj ; Fj ). Academic researchers
and rms are heterogeneous in terms of type of research and ability, i.e., it is possible that
xAi 6= xAi0 , xFj 6= xFj0 , Ai 6= Ai0 and/or Fj 6= Fj0 for Ai; Ai0 2 A and Fj ; Fj0 2 F . In this
subsection, we outline the conditions for equilibrium matching between matched partners.7 Still,
the one posited here, as shown in Banal-Estañol et al. (2013). In that paper, the prots of each partner decrease
with the distance between the (endogenous) type of the joint project and her (its) ideal type of project, or
the type they are most productive at (i.e., our xA and xF ). In equilibrium, the optimal type of the project lies
between the types of the participants (see also Pereira, 2007).
7 In an equilibrium, no academic or rm can improve upon her or its current payo¤. That is, no academic or
rm in a collaborative project can be better o¤ by developing a non-collaborative project and no academic and
rm can be better o¤ by leaving their current partners, if any, and forming a new partnership.
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there can be non-matched academics and rms in equilibrium, but we postpone the description
of their characteristics, as opposed to those of matched partners, to section 6.8
The next three blocks describe, in turn, the conditions under which the equilibrium matching
is positive or negative assortative with respect to ability, type, and ability-distance pairs as a
function of the parameters 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the prot function (1). Of course, the equilibrium
partnerships do not depend on the coe¢ cients related to the researcher only or to the rm only
(ca and 
c
f ), or indeed to the xed e¤ects to any collaboration, such as the running costs (C).
Ability. Ability is a vertical characteristic: the value function c increases in A (resp. F )
independently of the value of F (A). To capture these relationships, we include the cross-
product of A and F , which makes the value function twice-continuously di¤erentiable with
respect to A and F . As a result, a su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium matching to be
positive (resp. negative) assortative in terms of ability is that the cross-partial derivative with
respect to A and F is positive (negative) (see e.g., Legros and Newman, 2002).9 Since the
cross-partial derivative never changes sign (it is in fact constant, and equal to 1), the condition
is necessary and su¢ cient and the equilibrium matching is unique. As a result, top academics
collaborate with top rms and academics of lower ability collaborate with rms of lower ability
if and only if partner abilities are complementary (i.e., if and only if 1 > 0). Similarly, top
academics collaborate with low ability rms whereas low ability academics collaborate with top
rms if and only if 1 < 0. In this case, a low ability rm is willing to o¤er a top academic a
high transfer to make this collaboration more appealing to the academic. Similarly, low ability
academics can use transfers to lure high ability rms into a collaboration.10
Type. Type is a horizontal characteristic: the value function c increases or decreases in the
distance between xA and xF , not in the types themselves. We include a linear term based on the
absolute value of the di¤erence between types of research, which means that the value function is
8We consider, as is standard in the literature, that each agent has complete information on the characteristics
of all the agents, as well as on the value of any potential partnership. We also assume away search costs in nding
partners. As we show later, geographical distance is always insignicant in our regressions. This suggests that
search costs, at least in terms of geographical distance, are small.
9 In multivariate settings, the conditions for assortativeness in one characteristic are true as long as all aca-
demics, on one side, and all rms, on the other, are homogeneous with respect to the other characteristic. To
our knowledge, Lindenlaub (2014) is the rst to propose a general denition for positive and negative assorta-
tive matching that take into account heterogeneity along two characteristics for twice continously di¤erentiable
production functions.
10 If 1 = 0 then any matching is an equilibrium matching in terms of ability. This will also be the case for the
other cases if 2 = 0, 3 = 0, or 4 = 0.
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not twice-continuously di¤erentiable everywhere, with respect to xA and xF . Still, the positive
assortative matching is always an equilibrium matching if 2 < 0. Indeed, 2 < 0 implies that
the distance in types is costly and the positive assortative matching minimizes the sum of the
distances between the matched academics and rms. In other words, the positive equilibrium
matching is e¢ cient, in the sense that it maximizes total surplus, i.e., the sum of the values
of all projects in the market cannot be increased by reassigning rms and academics. As is well
known (see, e.g., Shapley and Shubik, 1972), e¢ cient matchings are equilibrium matchings in
models with transfers.11 As a result, if the heterogeneity in types is costly (i.e., if 2 < 0), the
academics with more applied interests shall collaborate with rms with more applied bias.12
Similarly, if 2 > 0 the negative assortative matching is always an equilibrium matching. In this
case, collaboration takes place between basic rms and applied academics, and vice-versa.
Ability-distance pairs. The value function c is twice continuously di¤erentiable with re-
spect to the ability and the distance, even though it is not with respect to the types themselves.
As in the case of ability, the equilibrium matching is unique, and it is also positive (resp. neg-
ative) assortative in terms of the academics ability-distance pair if and only if the academics
ability and distance in terms of type of research are complementary (substitute). In other words,
if 3 > 0 the higher the ability of the academics, the further they shall be to their partners in
terms of type of research. If, on the other hand, 3 < 0 the higher the ability of the academics,
the closer they shall be to their partners in terms of type of research. In this second case, the
distance in terms of type of research is more damaging (or less protable) for the most able aca-
demics. A similar argument can be made for the nature of the matching in terms of the rms
ability and distance as a function of 4. The equilibrium matching is positive (resp. negative)
assortative in terms of the rms ability-distance pair if and only if 4 > 0 (4 < 0).
11This property derives from competition in the market: as rms compete among themselves for their most
preferred academic partner, and academics compete among themselves for their most preferred rm partner, the
resulting matching maximizes the total surplus. If this was not the case, an agent, or a pair of agents, would
obtain more benets in an alternative matching.
12The equlibrium matching may not be necessarily unique, though. For example, if all academics are more
basic than all the rms, the negative assortative matching is also an equilibrium. For this particular distribution
of types, the sum of distances in both the positive and the negative assortative matchings are equal.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Sample
Our empirical analysis is based on the teams of academic researchers and rms that propose
research projects to the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). More
than half of the overall research funding for the engineering departments of the UK universities
comes from the EPSRC. EPSRC grants are allocated to teams of academic researchers alone
as well as to teams of academics and rms (rms alone cannot apply for EPSRC funds). As
dened by the EPSRC, collaborative research grantsare those that involve one or more rms
as industrial partners.13 Industrial partners contribute cash or in-kind services to the full
economic cost of the project.
Our initial sample includes all the EPSRC project proposals with the starting year 2005,
2006 or 2007. For each project, we know the holding organization, the principal investigator
(PI), the coinvestigators (if any), and the industry partners (if any). We take the projects
with at least one academic researcher (not necessarily the PI) in the longitudinal data set in
Banal-Estañol et al. (2015), which contains calendar information and publication data on all
the academics employed at all the engineering departments of the 40 major UK universities
until 2007. Our nal sample consists of 5; 855 projects (1; 912 in 2005, 1; 835 in 2006, and 2; 108
in 2007). As a whole, we have 2; 411 unique academic researchers and 1; 735 rms which are
involved in 2; 057 out of the 5; 855 projects. That is, 35% of the projects are collaborative
projects. The average number of researchers in each project is 2:86, and the average number of
rms in each collaborative project is 2:43.
We consider the teams of academics and the teams of rms as the relevant units. We take
the view that teams in each side of the market are formed before the two-sided matching market
starts. Therefore, the one-to-one matching model is the most suitable framework to analyze our
data. For simplicity, in the description of the results, we refer to a team of academics as an
academicand to a team of rms as a rm.Therefore, when we talk, for instance, about the
ability of the academic in the project, we mean the ability of the team of academics.
13Some partners in the EPSRC database are not private rms but are university research centers and schools,
large research infrastructures (e.g., the LNCC National Laboratory of Scientic Computing), government and
municipal councils, public agencies, public hospitals, charities, and trade associations (e.g., the International
Union of Railways). We disregard these partners as we only analyze collaboration with private rms.
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3.2 Main variables
To build proxies for scientic ability and type of each partner, we use publication information
prior to the start of the project. In particular, we use the publications for the ve years prior
to, as well as for the starting year of, the project (because they relate to research developed and
nished before the start of the project).14 For example, if the initial year of a project is 2007,
then we use the publications of the academics and the rms during the period 2002 to 2007.15
Publication data is extracted from the Thomson (formerly ISI) Web of Science (WoS) data-
base (for details, see Banal-Estañol et al., 2015). In total, our 2; 411 academic researchers
published 44; 399 articles in the years 2000 to 2007. Similarly, we identify 201; 296 publications
for the period 2000 to 2007 for the 1; 735 rms involved in the collaborative projects.
As a measure of scientic ability, we use the normal count of publications, the impact-
factor-weighted sum of publications, and the (average) impact-factor per publication, all of
them averaged per year.16 The impact factors are the Science Citation Index (SCI) Journal
Impact Factors (JIF), attributed to the publishing journal in the year of publication. The
second measure takes into account not only the quantity but also the quality of the publications.
Therefore, we use it as our main measure but also report the results for the normal count, which
measures quantity, and for the average impact factor, which can be considered a measure of
quality.
For the type of research, we use the Patent Board classication (Narin et al., 1976; Hamilton,
2003). Based on cross-citation matrices, it classies journals into four categories: (1) applied
technology, (2) engineering and technological science, (3) applied and targeted basic research,
and (4) basic scientic research. The rst two categories are considered to be technologyand
the last two science(see Godin, 1996; van Looy et al., 2006). We follow this distinction and
dene the type of research of a set of articles as the number of publications in the rst two
categories divided by the number of publications in all four categories.
In our regressions, we use the normal count and the impact-factor-weighted sum of publica-
tions per year, as well as the average impact-factor, of the whole team of academic researchers
in the project, but we also report results for the PI only. Similarly, we use the normal count,
14We present our results using the variables that include information for six years. But our results using
information for two or four years are very similar.
15Our measures of the rms are noisier than those of the academics because we do not know the name of
the researcher of the rm involved in the project. In addition, rms may have di¤erent policies with respect to
publication activities.
16Some of the academic researchers are not in our sample for the whole period, for example, because they
are junior or come from abroad. We take this into account by computing the average count and impact-factor-
weighted-sum per year, using the years available (out of the six years prior to the start of the project).
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the impact-factor-weighted sum of publications per year, and the average impact-factor, of the
whole team of rms participating in the project (there is no equivalent to the PI for the rms).
Since the distributions of these variables are highly skewed, we use the logarithm of the variables
plus the unit and we refer to these measures as the count, the impact, and the average
impactof each of the participants. Similarly, we use the average type of the team of academic
researchers, the type of the PI, as well as the average type of the team of rms in the project,
and refer to them as the typeof each of the participants.
3.3 Institutional variables
We obtain information on the size and performance of the departments of our academics from the
2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)results. The RAE provides aggregate information
on the number of active academics and research funds in each department for the period 2001
to 2007. We assign to each project the information of its holding institution.
We construct variables related to rm size and performance, using the FAME and ORBIS
databases. In particular, we compute the average (per rm in the team and per year) number of
employees and turnover (in millions of pounds). We also assign to each collaborative project the
one-digit Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) code of the rm(s). If the activity of the rms
in the project spans several sectors, we randomly assign one of them.17 Moreover, we assign
to each non-collaborative project the one-digit SIC code of the rms that collaborate with the
academics in other projects (if they have collaborated with rms associated to several SIC codes,
we randomly select one of them).
Finally, for the collaborative projects, we assign a variable which measures the geograph-
ical distance between the partners. We retrieved the postal codes of the universities and the
headquarters of the rms and, using an application of the UK government,18 we computed the
distance in miles between the postcode of the holding university and the UK-based rm in the
project. For rms based outside the UK, we dene a xed distance of 1; 000 miles. When there
are several rms, we use the minimum distance between the university and the rms.19
17We classify rmsactivity according to the 10 US SIC division structure. For those rms for which we only
have a UK SIC code, we make a simple translation from the two-digit UK SIC codes to US divisions. We assign
the articial division11 to those projects for which we cannot associate a division to any of the rms.
18http://www.education.gov.uk/cgi-bin/inyourarea/distance.pl?
19This reects the fact that the closest rm is the one that establishes the link with the university. We have also
run the regressions using the average distance of the rms, using UK rms only, and we obtain similar results.
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3.4 Descriptive statistics
As shown in table 1, the academic teams in our database published 10:6 articles on average per
year, with an impact of 16:9 and an average impact per publication of 1:392, during the six-year
period prior to the initial date of the project. Not surprisingly, the count and the impact of the
academics in the projects are highly correlated (0:889). For both variables, the mean is greater
than the median (for the impact, 16:9 vs 7) because the distributions are negatively skewed,
with many academic teams of low impact and count and some of high impact and count (the
maximum impact is 526:1). The average PI published 3:6 articles per year, with an impact of
5:6, which are highly correlated with the impact of the whole academic team (0:534 and 0:636,
respectively). The average count, impact and average impact for the rms is 749, 1; 448 and
1:21 respectively. The variance of the publications of the rms is much larger than that of the
academics, both in absolute terms and relative to the means. In comparison to those of the
academic teams, the distributions of the rms are even more skewed. The count, the impact,
and the average impact of the rms are positively correlated to the impact of the academics
in the same project, 0:223, 0:219, and 0:155, respectively. These correlations provide initial
preliminary evidence of positive assortative matching in terms of ability.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We can dene the type for the 5; 519 academic teams, 4; 674 PIs and 1; 563 teams of rms
with at least one publication in a journal included in the Patent Board classication. The
average type of the rms is more basic (0:579) than the average type of the academics (0:656)
and the PI (0:666). This is probably because rms do not give their employees an incentive to
publish or do not allow them to publish their most applied discoveries, which may be directly
protable for the rms.20 This fact suggests that the truetype of a rm is more applied than
the one observed in the data. In our empirical analyses, we use an adjusted measure of the
distance between an academic of the rm where the type of the rm is increased by a fraction of
0:1.21 The correlation between the types of the academics and the rms (0:368) provides initial
preliminary evidence of positive assortative matching in terms of a¢ nity.
20For academics the mean is lower than the median (0:656 vs 0:750) because the distribution of types is positively
skewed. In contrast, for rms the mean is similar to the median (0:579 vs 0:600) because the distribution has
rms spread over all the range of types.
21This adjusted distance leads to qualitatively similar but stronger results than by dening the distance as the
di¤erence between the type of the academic and the rm. We have also tried adding other amounts, and the
results are similar, but an increase of 0:1 gives the best estimates.
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We include the correlations between type and impact, which are all very signicant:  0:343
for academics,  0:396 for the PIs and  0:123 for the rms. The (unreported) correlations
between type and count are also negative, but the magnitudes are smaller. These correlations
indicate that more applied researchers, PIs, and rms publish less in high-impact journals.
Finally, in table 1 we also report the descriptive statistics of the institutional variables for
universities and rms.
4 Empirical strategy
We use both Foxs (2008) maximum score estimationmethod and Gompers et al.s (forthcom-
ing) probit-counterfactualapproach. The maximum score method structurally estimates the
parameters of the production function which determine the properties of the matching. This
approach relies on a rank orderproperty, which postulates that matchings that generate more
surplus in a deterministic setup are more likely to be observed. The probit-counterfactual ap-
proach does not attempt to estimate the production function. It assumes that the choices that
generate more utility are more likely to be realized. For a given collaborating academic or rm,
it estimates the likelihood of this agent ending up with her actual partner rather than with an
alternative counterfactual partner.
The main advantage of the maximum score estimation method over the probit-counterfactual
approach is that it explicitly accommodates rival choices. Random utility models, on which the
probit-counterfactual approach is based, assume instead that agents on each side of the market
make their partner choices independently. But, as discussed earlier, observed partner choices
may result from decisions of all agents on both sides of the market and, thus, they are determined
interdependently. Still, the maximum score method has several drawbacks: the precision of the
estimates can only be estimated using a subsampling procedure, and it is less e¢ cient and more
challenging computationally than the probit-counterfactual approach.
4.1 Maximum score estimation
Fox (2008) proposes the use of maximum score estimation to estimate a local value maximization
condition, which ensures pair-wise stability. As is well known, pair-wise stability is equivalent
to total surplus maximization, which, as discussed in section 2, is a necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for equilibrium matching. For the set of matched pairs, the local maximization condition
states that the sum of value from two observed matches is greater than the sum of value if they
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exchange partners:
c(Ai; Fj) + 
c(Ai0 ; Fj0)  c(Ai; Fj0) + c(Ai0 ; Fj) (3)
where (Ai; Fj) and (Ai0 ; Fj0) are two realized pairs in a given market, and therefore (Ai0 ; Fj) and
(Ai; Fj0) are unrealized counterfactual pairs in that market. In our empirical analysis, we assume
that there is a market in every sector and in every year, and that markets in di¤erent years and/or
di¤erent sectors are independent of each other. In total, we have complete information on 1; 240
pairs spread over 21 markets.
The crucial part of the maximum score estimation is the specication of the prot function,
c(; ). We use the linear production function introduced in the theoretical framework:
c(A;F ) = caA+
c
fF+1AF+2 jxA   xF j+3A jxA   xF j+4F jxA   xF j+AF C+":
(4)
As discussed in other papers (Yang et al., 2009; Akkus et al., 2014), coe¢ cients related to the
researcher only or to the rm only, or xed e¤ects to any collaboration, such as the running costs,
cannot be identied because they will cancel out in the local maximization condition (3). We can
only estimate interaction terms. The scale of the production function cannot be identied either.
Any increasing and a¢ ne monotonic transformation of the production function will produce the
same results. Following Matzkin (1993), to ensure the identication of the parameters in the
production function we include an interaction variable, AF where A is the total research funds
awarded to the department of the academic and F is the turnover of the rm. We normalize the
coe¢ cient for this variable to be 1, and, following standard practice, we report the regression
results of the one with the maximum score. In our estimations, it is always positive.
From the local prot-maximization conditions (3), we derive a system of inequalities. We ap-
ply maximum score estimation (Manski, 1975) and nd the production function that maximizes
the total number of inequalities. The objective is to maximize the following score function,
max


1
H
P
h2H
( P
fAi;Fj ;Ai0 ;Fj0g2Qh
1

c(Ai; Fj) + 
c(Ai0 ; Fj0)  c(Ai; Fj0) + c(Ai0 ; Fj)
)
(5)
where H is the number (and the set) of markets, 1 is the indicator function that is equal to 1
when the inequality in the bracket is true, Qh is the set of all quartets consisting of two realized
pairs in market h, and 
 = f1; 2; 3; 4g the set of variables over which to maximize. The
maximum score estimators will be a set of parameters 
 that maximize the score function.
As the objective function of the maximum score estimator is a step function, there are
many local optima. Therefore, we apply a global optimization routine, the di¤erential evolution
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method (Storn and Price, 1997), to estimate the parameters. We use Santiago and Foxs (2008)
template in Mathematica, adapted to our production function.
Maximum score estimation does not assume a distribution for the error terms; therefore,
we need to use subsampling techniques to calculate the condence intervals for the estimators.
Fox (2008) makes separate consistency arguments for one large matching market and many
independent matching markets. In our setting, we have 21 distinct matching markets and view
them as a number of independent markets sampled from a larger number of such markets. We
follow the procedure proposed in Santiago and Foxs (2008) toolkit. First, from the whole data,
we randomly generate 100 subsamples, each containing 19 markets. Second, we apply the above
estimation procedure to each of the subsamples and obtain 100 sets of parameter estimates.
Finally, for each of the parameters, we use the maximum score estimators of the subsample
procedure as its empirical distribution from which we calculate its 95% condence interval.
4.2 Probit-counterfactual approach
Our second approach follows Agrawal et al. (2008), Hegde and Tumlinson (2014), and Gom-
pers et al. (forthcoming). As in the maximum score estimation, we construct a xed set of
counterfactual collaborations, i.e., collaborations that were possible but were not formed. For
a given set of pair-wise characteristics of a collaboration, we estimate the likelihood that this
collaboration is an actual rather than a counterfactual collaboration. To that purpose, we run
probit regressions on the likelihood of forming a partnership, using a dependent variable which
has a value of 1 if the partnership is an actual pair and a value of 0 if it is a counterfactual pair.
In this case, the set of counterfactuals is constructed as follows. We take the set of academics
and rms that have a collaborative project. A pair formed by any of these academics and any of
these rms is a potential counterfactual pair if they do not form an actual collaboration but have
a collaborative project with other partners in the same market (i.e., in the same year and in the
same sector). For each actual collaborative project, we select four of these counterfactual pairs
in the following way. We randomly choose one counterfactual in which the academic coincides
with the one in the actual project; then one counterfactual in which the rm corresponds to the
one in the actual project; then another one for the academic and another one for the rm. We
alternate the choice in order to have a more balanced set of counterfactuals. We avoid repetitions
so that a counterfactual pair can only appear once. We add the resulting 5; 838 counterfactual
pairs to the 1; 485 actual pairs of which we have information on ability and type.22,23
22For a limited number of collaborative pairs, it is not possible to nd four counterfactual pairs. This is because
there are too few collaborations in that year and in that sector.
23We have also run all the regressions of the probit counterfactual-approach on a dataset containing two coun-
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We test the properties of the matching between academics and rms using the actual formed
partnerships, as well as the non-formed counterfactual partnerships we have constructed. In all
the regressions, we use pair-wise horizontal and vertical characteristics simultaneously. As each
academic and rm in an actual pair also appear in the same number of counterfactual pairs, the
individual characteristics have no impact on the likelihood of forming a partnership, as in the
maximum score estimation. We include year and sector xed e¤ects, and report robust standard
errors clustered at the academic researcher level, in all the regressions. We also include, as a
control, the variable that measures the geographical distance between the academics and the
rms in the projects. This variable, however, turns out to be insignicant in all the regressions.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Maximum score estimation
The rst four columns of table 2 describe the parameter estimates 
 = f1; 2; 3; 4g of function
(4). In the rst specication we use, as measure of ability, the impacts of the academic team
and the rm and, as a measure of appliedness, the types of the academic team and the rm. In
the second and third columns we use count and average impact, instead of impact, as a measure
of ability. In the fourth, we use the measures of the PI instead of those of the academic team.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In every specication parameter 1 is statistically greater than zero at a 95% condence level,
suggesting that partner abilities are complementary. This implies that there is positive assorta-
tive matching in terms of ability: top academics collaborate with top rms whereas academics
of lower ability collaborate with rms of lower ability.
Parameter 2 is always negative and, in all but one specication, statistically signicant,
which implies that the e¤ect of distance is negative. This suggests that there are no benets
from participant heterogeneity or that they are outweighed by the costs in terms of divergent
interests. Divergent interests may, for example, reduce the e¤ort supplied and the resulting value
of the project, e.g., the number of academic papers or patents. Our estimator on 2 suggests
that there can be positive assortative matching in terms of appliedness: academics with more
applied interests collaborate with rms with more applied bias.
terfactuals per project. The results are very similar to those obtained in the case of four counterfactuals. The
sign and the signicance of the coe¢ cients are almost the same, and the magnitudes of the e¤ects are similar.
These results suggest that an increased (or reduced) number of counterfactuals does not alter our results.
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As mentioned earlier, the estimator on 2 provides some support for the matching being
positive assortative in terms of type. As an additional test, we also run a linear regression on
the product of types, as well as on the product of abilities (even if this specication implicitly
assumes that type is a vertical characteristic). Column 5 provides more evidence of positive
assortative matching in terms of type, as it shows that the estimate of the cross-partial derivative
of the prot function with respect to the types is positive.
The coe¢ cients for 3 and 4 are all negative and all but two are signicant, thus providing
support for the matching being negative assortative in terms of academic ability-distance pair
and rm ability-distance pair, respectively. Thus, the higher the ability of the academic, the
closer she is to her partner in terms of type. Similarly, we have that the higher the ability of
the rm, the closer it is to its partner in terms of type.
We also test the properties of the matching using institutional measures of the universities
and the rms. We are particularly interested in determining whether rms select academic
researchers because of their individual characteristics or because of the characteristics of the
university they work for. As shown in columns 6 and 7, the coe¢ cients associated with university
research funds and rmsturnover (performance aggregate), and with university total number
of researchers and rmsemployees (size aggregate), are all positive but very small and all but
one are insignicant. We also run (unreported) regressions using other university characteristics
such as number of top quality papers, income, number of undergraduate and graduate students,
and expenses. Similarly, we consider other rmscharacteristics such as prots and assets. The
coe¢ cients associated with all of these variables also turn out to be insignicant.24
In terms of performance, our maximum score estimators in the structural equation satisfy
between 64:3% and 64:9% of the total number of inequalities in the objective function (5), in the
case where we use the measures of the academic team, and around 62:2% in the case where we
use the measures of the PI (bottom of table 2). These results are in line with those of previous
applications in the literature (e.g., Yang et al., 2009; Mindruta, 2013).25
24We used the RAE data to construct the variables that measure the number of top quality publications of
all the engineering departments at each university. Using data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency,
we obtained information related to the general characteristics of the universities: number of undergraduate and
graduate students and the universitys income and expenses. We also used the FAME and ORBIS databases to
compute the average (per rm in the team and per year) tangible assets and prots before tax.
25We also run regressions including (i) only ability and distance, as well as (ii) only ability and (iii) only
distance. The number of inequalities satised are 64:0%, 55:4% and 63:8%, respectively: These results suggest
that the horizontal characteristics have more explanatory power than the vertical characteristics, as we will conrm
in the probit-counterfactual approach.
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5.2 Probit-counterfactual approach
The probit counterfactual approach estimates the probability of matching directly. We use this
well-known model, rst, as an alternative test to the maximum score estimation results. Indeed,
we checked for the consistency of the two empirical approaches by regressing the likelihood of
being an actual match, as opposed to a counterfactual match, over the same (absolute) variables
we used in the linear specication of the maximum score estimation. The results on the cross-
partial e¤ects of the probability of matching are the same as those of the cross-partial derivatives
of value obtained in the previous section.
Second, and more importantly, this approach allows quantifying the impact of the ranking
of the academics and the rms. The assortative nature of the matching is an ordinal, not a
cardinal, property. So instead of the absolute values of ability and type, we use the rankings
of the academics and the rms in the two characteristics. We construct several categorical and
continuous variables accounting for the relative position of each agent in each side of the market.
Table 3 presents the average marginal e¤ects across all the observations, measured as discrete
changes in the case of the categorical variables and as derivatives for the continuous ones.26
[Insert Table 3 here]
We start by using two dummy variables that take the value of 1 if both the academic and the
rm are above the median of their respective distribution of ability and type, respectively, and
two other dummy variables that take the value of 1 if they are both below the median in terms
of impact and type, respectively. According to the results in column 1, the pairs of academics
and rms that are both above (below) the median of their respective distribution of abilities
are more likely to be matched, compared to those pairs in which one is above the median and
the other is below. Albeit positive, these e¤ects are not signicant. The e¤ects for the types
are instead very signicant. The academics and the rms are 6:9% and 8:4% more likely to
be matched if they are both above the median and both below the median in terms of type,
respectively. Given that the unconditional probability of being matched is 20%, this represents
34:5% and 42% in terms of the unconditional probability.
To further understand the e¤ect of the relative position of academics and rms, we divide the
set of academics and the set of rms in quartiles with respect to each characteristic. Column 2
shows that a pair is more likely to be an actual match, rather than a counterfactual match, if both
the academic and the rm are in the same quartile in terms of ability. This is especially the case
26The results of the marginal e¤ects at the mean of the variables are similar.
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for the top quartile, in which the conditional probability is 6:1% higher and the unconditional
one 30:5% higher. In the case of the bottom quartile, the e¤ect is not signicant.
As a next step, we use the di¤erence in terms of quartiles. We assign to each academic
and rm in a match the value of their quartile (from 1 to 4), and compute the pairs quartile
di¤erence, dened as the absolute value of the di¤erence between the quartile of the academic
and the quartile of the rm. Column 3 shows the di¤erence in predicted probabilities for the case
in which the quartile di¤erence is one, two, and three, as compared to the case of a di¤erence of
zero, for both the ability and the type. Again, the probability of being matched is lower if the
di¤erence is positive. Still, the e¤ects of the ability appear to be rather at, whereas the e¤ects
of the type are increasing in the di¤erence and, overall, stronger.
We also use two variables with the full ranking, with respect to impact and type, for the
academics and the rms.27 To be able to appreciate the magnitude of the e¤ects, we divide
the ranking by one thousand. Column 4 reports the average marginal e¤ects. As expected, a
higher distance in the ranking in impact and type leads to a lower likelihood of matching. In
terms of magnitudes, increasing the di¤erence between the ranking, in terms of impact, of the
academic and that of the rm by one thousand positions lowers the conditional probability of
being matched by 2:2% (11% of the unconditional probability), whereas the e¤ect in terms of
type is 10:1% (50:5% of the unconditional probability).
In sum, table 3 suggests that the positive nature of the matching is stronger for the type,
which is a horizontal characteristic, than for the impact, which is a vertical attribute. The
coe¢ cients for the joint variables in types are three to four times higher than the coe¢ cients for
the corresponding variables for impact. The numbers are meaningful because the variables reect
the relative positions of the agents, which allow for the comparison of the two characteristics.
6 Collaborating versus staying independent
The equilibrium matching determines not only who collaborates with whom but also who col-
laborates and who remains independent. This section describes the characteristics that make
academics more likely to develop collaborative rather than non-collaborative projects. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot analyze which rms would be more likely to conduct non-collaborative projects
because rms alone cannot apply for EPSRC funding and are thus not in our dataset.
As before, we use both Foxs (2008) maximum score estimation method and a probit ap-
proach. Again, the main advantage of maximum score estimation over the probit approach is
27The ordering treats equal numbers as average ranking. That is, if the impacts were 1, 7, 7, 20, then the
associated ranks would be 1, 2:5, 2:5, 4.
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that it explicitly accommodates rival choices. Low quality academics may end up not collabo-
rating with a rm not because they do not want to but because the rms prefer other academics.
Moreover, the maximum score estimation allows us to estimate another parameter: the di¤erence
between the individual e¤ect of the academics in collaborative and non-collaborative projects.
But, knowing the parameters of the prot function does not always allow us to make general
statements about the characteristics of the academics who collaborate with rms as opposed to
those who do not. Therefore, as a second approach, we run probit regressions which, in addition,
allow us to quantify the impact of several characteristics on the probability of being matched.
6.1 Maximum score estimation
We extend Foxs (2008) maximum score estimation approach described in section 4 to include,
in addition to local value maximization conditions based on matched pairs, shown in (3), local
value maximization conditions also involving non-matched academics:28
c(Ai; Fj) + 
n
A(Ai0)  nA(Ai) + c(Ai0 ; Fj) (6)
where (Ai; Fj) is a realized pair and Ai0 a non-matched academic in a given market.29 As before,
we use the econometric specication of the collaborative prots c(A;F ), shown in (4). We also
add an error term to the non-collaborative prots of the academic nA(A) shown in (2). In the
estimation, we include, in addition to the 1; 240 pairs used in section 5, 2; 842 non-collaborative
academic projects for which we have complete information, spread over the same 21 markets.
This allows us to estimate not only the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms f1; 2; 3; 4g, but
also the di¤erence between the individual e¤ects of the ability of the academic, ca   na . Still,
the lack of information on non-collaborative rms may add some noise to the estimation. As
explained earlier, coe¢ cients related to xed e¤ects to the researcher or to the rm, or xed
e¤ects to any collaboration, such as the running costs, cannot be identied because they will
cancel out in the local maximization conditions (3) and (6).
The last two columns of table 2 describe the parameter estimates using, as measures of
ability, the impacts and the counts of the academic team and the rm and, as a measure of
appliedness, the types of the academic team and the rm. Once again, we report the 95%
condence intervals, obtained from 50 random subsamples. The coe¢ cients of the interaction
terms have the same sign as before, although 3 and 4 are less often signicantly di¤erent from
28We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach to us.
29Unfortunately, we cannot include local value maximization conditions involving non-collaborating rms, i.e.,
c (Ai; Fj)  n (Ai) + n (Fj) and c (Ai; Fj) + n (Fj0)  c (Ai; Fj0) + n (Fj), where (Ai; Fj) is a realized
pair and Fj0 a non-matched rm, because we do not have information on non-matched rms.
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zero (1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3  0, and 4  0). The coe¢ cient for ca na is negative (and signicant
in the second specication), suggesting, going back to the discussion in section 2, that there may
be moral hazard problems when academics work in collaborative projects.
We now use the estimated parameters of the value function to analyze the characteristics of
the academics who collaborate with rms as opposed to those that do not. Take rst a given
academic Ai that may form a partnership with a given rm Fj . They will develop a collaborative
project rather than two non-collaborative ones if 1(Ai; Fj)  c(Ai; Fj) nA(Ai) nF (Fj) > 0
where
1(Ai; Fj) = (
c
a   na)Ai + (cf   nf )Fj + 1AiFj + 2
xAi   xFj 
+3Ai
xAi   xFj + 4Fj xAi   xFj   (C   ca   cf ) > 0: (7)
Given our estimated parameters (2 < 0, 3  0, and 4  0), distance between typesxAi   xFj  has an unambiguously negative e¤ect on 1(Ai; Fj). The ability of the academic
has instead conicting e¤ects on 1(Ai; Fj). On the one hand, given that 1 > 0, there is a
positive e¤ect because of the complementarities between the abilities of the partners. But, on
the other hand, as 3  0, there may be a negative e¤ect due to the substitutability between
ability and distance in types. Moreover, as (ca   na)  0, the individual e¤ect of the ability
when the academic works in collaboration with a rm can be lower than when she runs a non-
collaborative project. Still, if we assume that rms face similar issues to the academics when
working in collaborative projects, i.e., (cf   nf )  0, the overall e¤ect of ability in the net
benets of collaboration are positive. Indeed, collaboration can only be protable for some level
of ability if (ca   na) + 1Fj + 3
xAi   xFj  > 0 and, in this case, 1(Ai; Fj) is increasing in
Ai .
Academic Ai may not form a partnership with rm Fj even if 1(Ai; Fj) > 0 because rm
Fj may instead collaborate with another (non-collaborating) academic Ai0 In equilibrium, the
pair (Ai; Fj) develops a collaborative project and Ai0 stays independent instead of Ai0 and Fj
forming a partnership and Ai staying independent if 2(Ai; Ai0 ; Fj)  c(Ai; Fj) + nA(Ai0)  
nA(Ai) c(Ai0 ; Fj) > 0,30 where we can write
2(Ai; Ai0 ; Fj) =
 
(ca   na) + 1Fj + 3
xAi   xFj   Ai   Ai0
+
 
2 + 3Ai0 + 4Fj
  xAi   xFj   xAi0   xFj  : (8)
Following the same arguments as above, this condition is more likely to hold if the distance
between the types of academic Ai and rm Fj is lower and if the ability of Ai is larger.
30This is in fact the local maximization condition (6).
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We now use the results of a given specic pair to discuss who collaborates, and who does not,
when we take into account the whole population of academics and rms. In terms of ability, the
message is clear: the higher the ability of an academic, the more likely it is that she will develop
a collaborative project. There are two e¤ects working in the same direction. First, as shown
in the analysis of a specic pair, a higher A has a direct positive impact on the net benets
of collaboration. Second, given that the matching is positive assortative in terms of ability, an
academic with a higher A is matched with a rm with a higher F , which reinforces the rst
positive e¤ect.
In terms of type, it is not possible to make a general statement on who collaborates and who
does not even if, among the collaborating pairs, the equilibrium matching is positive assortative.
This part of the equilibrium matching depends not only on the parameters of the prot function
but also on the particular distribution of types on each side of the market. For example, if the
types of the academics were in general more basic than those of the rms then the analysis of
a given specic pair suggests that the most applied academics would collaborate, whereas the
most basic academics would remain independent. Indeed, as the relative gains from collaboration
with more distant partners would be lower, more basic academics would nd it relatively more
protable to stay independent. In contrast, if the types of the academics were in general more
applied than those of the rms then the most basic academics would collaborate. Although the
former is more likely than the latter, we cannot check if any of these conditions are satised in
the data because we do not observe the distribution of types of the whole population of rms.
6.2 Probit approach
As a second approach, we run probit regressions on the academicslikelihood of collaborating
over several measures of ability and type. We use a dependent variable which has a value of 1
if the academic chooses to submit a collaborative project and a value of 0 if she submits a non-
collaborative one. We control for year and university xed e¤ects, and report robust standard
errors.
Table 4 reports the average marginal e¤ects (again in terms of di¤erences in predicted prob-
abilities in the case of the categorical variables). Conrming the results of the discussion in the
previous subsection, columns 1 and 2 show that the most able, measured in terms of impact
and count respectively, as well as the most applied researchers, are signicantly more likely to
collaborate. The magnitudes of the e¤ects are easier to compare in the case of the ranking vari-
ables. First, column 3 shows that the academics who are above the median in terms of ability
and type are 3:3% and 14:1% more likely to collaborate, respectively, than those who are below
25
the median. Given that the unconditional probability of collaborating is 35%; the increases rep-
resent 9:4% and 40:3% in terms of the unconditional probability. In column 4, we consider the
rank of the academics in terms of impact and type. The regression shows that moving up the
rank in any of the two characteristics has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the probability of
collaboration. In terms of magnitudes, an academic who climbs 1; 000 positions in the ranking in
impact increases the conditional probability of collaboration by 10% (28:6% of the unconditional
probability), whereas the e¤ect in types is 25% (71:4% of the unconditional probability). With
respect to the institutional measures, column 5 shows that university variables, including size
and performance, are not signicant.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Taken together, our empirical results suggest that the likelihood of collaborating increases
with the ability and type of the academics in the project. That is, more able and more applied
academics are more likely to collaborate as opposed to staying independent. Our results also
suggest that, as is the case in the matching regressions, the e¤ects of the horizontal characteristics
are stronger than those of the vertical ones.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes university-industry collaboration as an endogenous matching problem. We
use a two-sided market matching framework of academic researchers and rms that are hetero-
geneous in terms of ability- and a¢ nity-based characteristics. Depending on the value of the
parameters, the matching can be positive or negative assortative in terms of ability and type of
research, as well as in terms of their interactions.
Our empirical analysis uses the teams of academic researchers and rms that propose re-
search projects to the EPSRC. We estimate the parameters of the prot function proposed in
the theoretical framework using the maximum score estimation method (Fox, 2008). The es-
timated parameters suggest that partner abilities are complementary and that the joint prot
function is decreasing in the distance between types. Moreover, individual ability and distance
are substitute attributes. As a result, there is positive assortative matching in terms of ability
and type while the matching is negative assortative in terms of ability-a¢ nity pairs. Our results
also suggest that the most able and the most applied academic researchers prefer to develop
collaborative projects, rather than stand-alone ones.
As an alternative to maximum score estimation, we also use a probit approach which, in
addition, allows us to quantify the e¤ects. We show that a¢ nity-based characteristics are rela-
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tively more important than ability-based ones. In general, the characteristics at the individual-
researcher level are more relevant than those at the institutional level.
In this paper, we address university-industry collaborations in research projects. Still, our
approach can also be used to analyze collaboration decisions in other two-sided markets. Ex-
amples of such markets could include other channels of knowledge and technology transfer,
interactions between suppliers and rms, and relationships between entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists. As in our set up, agents in these markets are heterogeneous along horizontal and
vertical dimensions and participants can collaborate and, in some cases, stay independent.
By analyzing collaboration across institutional markets (i.e., two-sided market partnerships),
this paper complements previous studies about collaboration across institutions within institu-
tional markets (i.e., one-sided market partnerships). A natural next step would be to study the
interaction between the two, and identify whether collaboration among academic researchers
substitutes or complements collaboration between academic researchers and rms.
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Corr. academics' Corr. PI's Corr. firms'
impact impact impact
Academics' count (in hundreds) 5855 0.106 0.146 0.059 0.000 2.237 0.889*** 0.502*** 0.172***
Academics' impact (in hundreds) 5855 0.169 0.309 0.070 0.000 5.261 1 0.636*** 0.219***
Academics' average impact 5688 1.392 1.013 1.177 0.000 19.190 0.361*** 0.479*** 0.212***
PI's count (in hundreds) 5067 0.036 0.037 0.027 0.000 0.350 0.534*** 0.854*** 0.058***
PI's impact (in hundreds) 5067 0.056 0.081 0.028 0.000 0.920 0.636*** 1 0.137***
PI's average impact 4870 1.355 1.055 1.124 0.000 19.190 0.328*** 0.501*** 0.212***
Firms' count (in thousands) 2057 0.749 1.836 0.080 0.000 17.625 0.223*** 0.120*** 0.901***
Firms' impact (in thousands) 2057 1.448 5.173 0.066 0.000 58.543 0.219*** 0.137*** 1
Firms' average impact 1634 1.210 0.942 0.944 0.000 9.620 0.155*** 0.148*** 0.467***
Corr. PI's Corr. firms' Corr. respect
type type impact
Academics' type 5519 0.656 0.328 0.750 0.000 1.000 0.947*** 0.368*** ‐0.343***
PI's type 4674 0.666 0.343 0.780 0.000 1.000 0.343*** ‐0.396***
Firms' type 1563 0.579 0.284 0.600 0.000 1.000 ‐0.123***
Corr. university Corr. firms' Corr. firms'
active res. turnover employees
University research funds (in millions) 5933 6.259 3.974 5.484 0.123 12.167 0.908*** 0.089*** 0.111***
University active researchers (in tens) 5933 14.243 7.220 12.875 0.800 29.310 0.118*** 0.106***
Firms' turnover (in millions) 1580 10.830 25.128 1.150 0.000 178.525 0.538***
Firms' employees (in ten thousands) 1549 3.524 6.306 0.819 0.000 47.250
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
We report the descriptive statistics for the vertical attributes (normal count, impact‐weighted sum and average impact of the publications in the previous six years) of the team of academics, the PI
and the firms, the horizontal attributes (type of the publications), and two aggregate characteristics for each side of the market (university research funds, university active researchers, firms'
turnover and firms' employees).
Mean
St dev
St devMeanObservations
Observations St dev Median Min Max
Median Min Max
MaxMinMedian
Aggregate attributes
Horizontal attributes
Vertical attributes Observations Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Measure of ability Impact Count Average impact Impact Impact Size Performance Impact Count
Academic unit Academic team Academic team Academic team PI Academic team University University Academic Academic
Academics' ability*Firms' ability 7.33 12.57 27.75 18.64 4.67 14.84 24.43
(6.49, 10.24) (7.31, 18.19) (25.95, 31.92) (8.19, 25.84) (3.56, 7.44) (7.54,	19.47) (21.57, 33.45)
Type distance ‐17.42 ‐16.40 ‐3.78 ‐13.91 ‐27.45 ‐24.55
(‐21.10, ‐15.08) (‐24.73, ‐13.55) (‐5.84, 2.05) (‐19.37, ‐12.81) (‐37.80, ‐23.30) (‐28.15, ‐22.92)
Academics' ability*Type distance ‐6.47 ‐7.52 ‐11.05 ‐51.89 ‐30.57 ‐23.01
(‐8.93, ‐2.45) (‐8.31, 2.78) (‐15.32, ‐3.40) (‐101.29, ‐33.71) (‐52.94, 25.57) (‐31.29,  17.70)
Firms' ability*Type distance ‐4.39 ‐5.47 ‐4.35 ‐2.74 ‐3.32 ‐4.68
(‐7.93, ‐4.15) (‐10.78, ‐3.28) (‐14.14, ‐4.09) (‐6.03, 0.59) (‐9.47, 5.32) (‐12.22, ‐1.96)
Academics' type*Firms' type 49.83
(46.75, 83.28)
Unis' agg ability*Firms' agg ability 0.14 0.07
(0.01, 0.20) (‐0.01, 0.11)
Unis' type*Firms' type 6.38 7.4
(‐9.61, 10.42) (‐11.46, 10.01)
Diff. individual effect academic ability ‐4.10 ‐7.59
(‐31.61, 5.07) (‐30.20, ‐2.97)
Total inequalities 98701 98701 98701 77586 98701 98701 98701 534626 534626
%  satisfied 64.3 64.3 64.9 62.2 64.2 57.0 56.8 62.7 62.6
This table reports the results of the maximum score estimation method for a linear production function of vertical and horizontal pairwise characteristics of academics and firms. Column 1 uses, as
measures of ability and type, the impact and the type of the academic and the impact and the type of the firm; Columns 2 and 3 use, instead of the impact, the count and the average impact of the
academic and the count and the average impact of the firm; and Column 4 uses the measures of the PI instead of those of the academic team. In all these specifications, we include the product of university
research funds and firm’s turnover as an additional interaction variable to ensure identification. Column 5 uses the same measures as Column 1 but reports the effect of the product of types instead of the
effect of the distance. Column 6 uses, as measures of ability and type, the total research funds and the average type of the university the PI belongs to and the turnover and the type of the firm; Column 7
uses, as measures of ability and type, the total number of researchers and the average type of the university the PI belongs to and the number of employees and the type of the firm. In the last two
specifications, we include the impact of the academic and of the firm as an additional interaction variable to ensure identification. Columns 8 and 9 use the same measures as Columns 1 and 2 but include
the difference between the individual effects of the ability when the academic works in collaboration and when she does not. We report the 95% confidence interval of each coefficient.
Table 2. Maximum score estimation for the linear production function.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Categories Categories Distances of Distances of
(medians) (quartiles) Quartiles Ranks
Both above median in impact 0.014
[0.010]
Both below median in impact 0.012
[0.014]
Both in 1st quartile in impact 0.061***
[0.017]
Both in 2nd quartile in impact 0.028*
[0.016]
Both in 3rd quartile in impact 0.033**
[0.016]
Both in 4rd quartile in impact 0.038
[0.076]
Both above median in type 0.069*** 0.069***
[0.012] [0.012]
Both below median in type 0.084*** 0.077***
[0.012] [0.012]
Distance of quartiles in impact (1 unit) ‐0.040***
[0.011]
Distance of quartiles in impact (2 units) ‐0.038***
[0.013]
Distance of quartiles in impact (3 units) ‐0.031*
[0.018]
Distance of quartiles in types (1 unit) ‐0.025**
[0.012]
Distance of quartiles in types (2 units) ‐0.080***
[0.013]
Distance of quartiles in types (3 units) ‐0.112***
[0.015]
Distance of rank of impact ‐0.022**
[0.011]
Distance of rank of types ‐0.101***
[0.011]
Observations 7323 7323 7323 7323
Table 3. Results of the probit‐counterfactual approach for the ranking measures.
This table presents the results of probit regressions for the probability of an academic and firm to
partner with each other based on a set of pairwise ranking characteristics. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable equal to one if the collaboration between the pair takes place (actual pairs) and zero
otherwise (counterfactual pairs). Independent variables are pairwise variables accounting for the
relative position of each agent in each side of the market. Both below/above the median in
impact/type, and Both in the 1st/2nd/3rd/4th quartile in impact are dummy variables which take the
value of one if the condition is satisfied and zero otherwise. Distance of quartiles/rank in impact/type is
a discrete variable which measures the absolute value of the difference between the rank
order/quartile number of the academic and the firm in terms of impact/type. Columns 1‐2 report the
differences in predicted probabilities of matching for each of the dummy variables (dummy equal to 1
less dummy equal to 0) while keeping all the others at their mean levels. Columns 3‐4 report the
marginal effects of each variable while keeping the others at their mean levels. We report robust
standard errors clustered at the academic level in brackets. Year and sector fixed effects are included.
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) `
Impact Count Medians Ranks Aggregate
Academics' ability 0.092** 0.259*** 0.084**
[0.038] [0.058] [0.037]
Academics' type 0.234*** 0.231*** 0.233***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
Academics above median in impact 0.033**
[0.015]
Academics above median in type 0.141***
[0.015]
Rank academics' impact 0.100***
[0.024]
Rank academics' type 0.250***
[0.024]
University performance ‐0.013
[0.026]
University size 0.048
[0.030]
Observations 5513 5513 5513 5513 5517
Table 4. Results of the probit regresssions on the collaboration decision.
This table reports the marginal effects of the probit regressions for the probability that an academic collaborates with a firm based
on a set of observable characteristics. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the academic collaborates, and
zero if she stays independent. Independent variables are characteristics of the academic team. Columns 1 and 2 use, as measures of
ability, the impact and the count, respectively. Column 3 displays the marginal effects on the probability of matching for academics
above the median, in terms of impact and type, having as reference those that are below the median. Column 4 displays the effects
of rank. The last column adds to the specification in Column 1 aggregate measures for the university (university research funds and
number of staff). We report robust standard errors clustered at the academic level in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all
regressions, and university fixed effects are included in all the regressions but the last one. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficients
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
